Spotlight on Upcoming Oral Arguments – November 2025

The following arguments will be available live to the public, both in-person and through online audio streaming. Access information will be available by 9 AM ET each day of argument at: https://cafc.uscourts.gov/home/oral-argument/listen-to-oral-arguments/. 

Thursday, November 6, 2025, 10:00 A.M.

Crocs, Inc. v. ITC, No. 2024-1300, Courtroom 201, Panel G

In the underlying Section 337 proceeding, Crocs alleged infringement of its 3D marks relating to the upper configuration of the classic clog. The ITC, weighing the DuPont factors for assessing a likelihood of confusion, found that Crocs failed to show the participating respondents infringed the 3D marks. The ITC thus found no Section 337 violation by the participating respondents and denied Croc’s request for a general exclusion order but did issue a limited exclusion order against the defaulting respondents. Crocs appealed.

On appeal, the parties dispute whether Crocs’ appeal was timely. Crocs filed its notice of appeal after the presidential review period and more than 60 days after the ITC issued its final determination. The ITC contends that the 60-day appeal period began when it issued the final determination and Crocs failed to appeal within that period, so the appeal should be dismissed as untimely. According to the ITC, its no-violation determination and refusal to issue a general exclusion order were final and appealable on the day they were issued. Crocs counters that the ITC determination, as a whole, was not final until the presidential review period ended.

On the merits, Crocs contends that the ITC erred in assessing the DuPont likelihood-of-confusion factors to find non-infringement. Among other errors, Crocs argues that the ITC failed to give sufficient weight to factors showing confusion and that it erred in giving dispositive weight to a control survey that improperly incorporated aspects of the 3D marks into the control. The ITC, in response, argues that the non-infringement determination should be affirmed even if the appeal were allowed to proceed. The ITC emphasizes that Crocs’ 3D marks at issue are narrowly limited to the specific patterns of holes and textured strips, not the overall clog design or other unprotected elements. The ITC contends that the determination below took that into account in evaluating the DuPont factors and that the likelihood-of-confusion evidence presented by Crocs wrongly focused on the overall look of the clog including unprotected elements.

Additionally, Crocs challenges the ITC’s refusal to issue a general exclusion order based on the violation by the defaulting respondents. The ITC counters that, because Crocs did not prove violation under the applicable evidentiary standard to support a general exclusion order, Crocs is not entitled to one.

Thursday, November 6, 2025, 10:00 A.M.

Supernus Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Ajanta Pharma Limited, No. 2024-1606, Courtroom 201, Panel G

Torrent filed an Abbreviated New Drug Application to market a generic version of Supernus’ Trokendi XR® product, a topiramate drug used to treat epilepsy and migraines. Supernus sued Torrent for infringing its U.S. Pat. Nos. 8,992,989, 9,549,940, and 9,622,983, related to extended-release formulations of topiramate. The district court found the asserted patents not invalid but infringed under the doctrine of equivalents (“DOE”). In reaching its infringement determination, the court rejected Torrent’s prosecution-history-estoppel argument.

During prosecution of a related patent, to overcome the Examiner’s written-description rejection under § 112, Supernus amended its claims to recite formulations comprising a coating “selected from the group consisting of cellulosic polymers and acrylic polymers.” Torrent argued that this narrowing amendment disclaimed formulations with other coating materials such as the alleged equivalent at issue, polyvinyl acetate (a vinyl polymer). The district court, however, found that the presumption of prosecution history estoppel was rebutted because the amendment was only tangentially related to the alleged equivalent. The court thus held that Torrent infringed under the DOE. Torrent appealed.

On appeal, among other arguments, Torrent takes issue with the district court’s application of the tangential-relation exception. According to Torrent, this exception applies only where the reason for the claim amendment bears no more than “a tangential relationship” to the alleged equivalent. Here, continues Torrent, the only objectively apparent reason for Supernus’ amendment was to “disclaim coverage of any other coating materials containing polymers other than cellulosic and acrylic polymers.” This reason, according to Torrent, bears a direct, not tangential, relation to the vinyl-polymer equivalent at issue and therefore precludes application of the exception. Torrent thus contends that prosecution history estoppel should have barred Supernus’ assertion of infringement under the DOE.

In response, Supernus argues that the district court properly found only a tangential relation between the amendment in question and the alleged equivalent. According to Supernus, the amendment addressed the Examiner’s § 112 rejection and was not intended to exclude the alleged equivalent here. Supernus also argues, in the alternative, that prosecution history estoppel does not apply because the amendment was made during the prosecution of an unasserted patent, and the amended term does not appear in the asserted claims.

Monday, November 10, 2025, 10:00 A.M.

Micron Technology Inc. v. Longhorn IP LLC, No. 2023-2007, Courtroom 201, Panel K

This appeal stems from a district court order requiring patent-assertion entities to post a bond under a state bad-faith-assertion law before proceeding with their patent infringement suit. Under Idaho’s Bad Faith Assertions of Patent Infringement Act (“BFA” Act), a court may order a bond if a defendant shows that a plaintiff’s infringement assertions are made in bad faith. After a Longhorn affiliate and patent-assertion entity sued Micron for patent infringement, Micron raised a BFA counterclaim and sued Longhorn in state court with a bond motion. The state court case was later removed to the Idaho district court, which presided over both cases. The district court denied the Longhorn entities’ motion to dismiss Micron’s BFA claim. The court also granted Micro’s bond motion, requiring Longhorn to post an $8 million bond before proceeding with its infringement claims. Longhorn appealed.

On appeal, Longhorn raises both as-applied and facial challenges to the BFA Act. For its as-applied challenge, Longhorn contends that Micron’s BFA claim should have been dismissed because Micron failed to demonstrate that Longhorn’s patent infringement assertions were objectively baseless. Longhorn also contends that the Act is facially unconstitutional and preempted by federal law. According to Longhorn, the Act ignores that patent infringement assertions are presumed to be made in good faith and that the Act distorts the balance of rights in patent litigation. Relatedly, Longhorn contends that the district court wrongly and unconstitutionally ordered a coercive bond under the Act to punish it for enforcing its patents.

In response, Micron argues that the appeal should be dismissed because the bond order is not an injunction-like order qualifying for an interlocutory appeal and is not an appealable collateral order. Further, Micron argues that even if the appeal were proper, Longhorn’s challenges to the BFA Act fail. Specifically, Micron contends that it pleaded detailed factual assertions to demonstrate objective bad faith under the BFA Act, and that patent law does not preempt state law tort claims based on bad-faith patent assertions. Further, Micron argues that the district court properly applied the Act to order the bond.

This case presents the first appeal to the Federal Circuit challenging a bond order under state law. The court’s decision may address how state-law bond requirements impact patent infringement suits involving patent assertion entities.