Spotlight on Upcoming Oral Arguments – April 2026

The following arguments will be available live to the public, both in-person and through online audio streaming. Access information will be available by 9 AM ET each day of argument at: https://cafc.uscourts.gov/home/oral-argument/listen-to-oral-arguments/.

Thursday, April 9, 2026, at 10:00 A.M.

Extremity Medical, LLC v. Nextremity Solutions Inc., et al., No. 2025-1160, Courtroom 402, Panel H

This appeal primarily concerns whether the district court properly denied recovery of IPR fees in a case involving the assertion of a single patent claim that the plaintiff largely declined to defend on validity grounds.

In 2022, Extremity filed an infringement suit against Nextremity et al. for the alleged infringement of a single claim of the patent at issue, U.S. Patent No. 5,505,589. In response to Extremity’s complaint, Nextremity filed an IPR to invalidate the claim, and the parties jointly agreed to stay the litigation pending resolution of the IPR. Extremity did not substantively dispute the invalidity argument Nextremity raised in the IPR and instead sought to amend the claim twice. Extremity later characterized this approach as a cost-minimizing strategic decision. The PTAB subsequently invalidated the claim, and Nextremity moved for fees in the district court under § 285. The court held that the case was “exceptional” primarily because of Extremity’s failure to rebut Nextremity’s invalidity arguments throughout the IPR and during fee briefing. The court awarded the requested fees in part – permitting recovery of fees incurred during the district court litigation but denying those incurred in the IPR. It relied on the Federal Circuit’s decision in Dragon Intellectual Property LLC v. Dish Network LLC, 101 F.4th 1366, (Fed. Cir. 2024), which stated that fees incurred during voluntarily pursued parallel IPR proceedings are not recoverable under § 285. The parties cross-appealed the decision, with Extremity appealing the award of district court fees, and Nextremity appealing the denial of IPR fees.

Both parties argue that the district court did not correctly apply the “totality of the circumstances” approach under § 285. Extremity argues that the court failed to consider its allegedly cost-minimizing litigation conduct when first deeming the case “exceptional,” and Nextremity argues that the district court erred by extending the Dragon rule broadly to all IPR proceedings without considering the specific facts of the case, claiming that this runs counter to the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877 (1989). Sullivan held that related administrative proceedings which are “intimately tied to the resolution of a judicial action” and necessary to attain Congress’ intended fee shifting results should be included in the award. Nextremity contends that Dragon is inapposite here given the issue-dispositive nature of the IPR and the parties' course of conduct.

Thursday, April 9, 2026, 10:00 A.M.

Carnegie Institution of Washington v. Fenix Diamonds LLC, No. 24-1804, Courtroom 201, Panel G

M7D sued Fenix alleging infringement of U.S. Pat. Nos. 6,858,078 and RE41,189, under its exclusive licensing agreement with Carnegie, the patent owner. These patents relate to “methods of producing high-clarity diamonds.” The district court granted summary judgment of non-infringement in Fenix’s favor. An appeal was sought but abandoned following M7D’s insolvency.

Following the abandoned appeal, Fenix sought an exceptional case determination, attorneys’ fees, non-taxable costs, and prejudgment interest. The district court found the case exceptional, awarded attorneys’ fees and non-taxable costs but denied prejudgment interest. The district court also found Carnegie jointly and severally liable for the award. Carnegie’s appeal, and Fenix’s cross-appeal, followed.

On appeal, Carnegie raises four issues. First, it challenges the district court's exceptional case finding. Carnegie asserts the arguments proffered were neither baseless nor unreasonable when made. Rather, the district court’s change in construction between the Markman and summary judgment orders made the arguments seem baseless and unreasonable in hindsight. Second, Carnegie argues in the alternative that the award should be reduced, as the higher standard for awarding non-taxable costs was not met. Third, Carnegie argues the joint and several liability finding was in error because: such a holding contradicts Carnegie and M7D’s license agreement, and the alleged misconduct is attributable to M7D. Fourth, and finally, Carnegie asserts that the award violates due process for lack of notice due to grounds it alleges the district court invoked sua sponte.

Fenix rebuts Carnegie’s positions, while raising a fifth issue on cross-appeal. First, Fenix argues the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the case exceptional. It asserts the district court properly found the litigation baseless and litigated in an unreasonable manner because, in Fenix’s view, the district court consistently construed terms throughout. Second, it argues precedent supports the district court’s award of non-taxable costs, as it first found the case exceptional and then identified evidence of bad faith. Third, Fenix argues that the district court's joint and several liability finding is consistent with precedent and the doctrine’s underpinnings, due to M7D’s insolvency, Carnegie’s voluntary joinder, and Carnegie’s contractual approval rights over litigation decisions. Fourth, it argues Carnegie’s due process arguments are legally and factually incorrect, asserting Carnegie had notice. Fifth, and finally, Fenix challenges the district court’s determination Fenix waived its right to prejudgment interest. It asserts seeking prejudgment interest any sooner would have been speculative and no exceptional circumstances exist to warrant withholding interest.