Spotlight on Upcoming Oral Arguments – February 2026

The following arguments will be available live to the public, both in-person and through online audio streaming. Access information will be available by 9 AM ET each day of argument at: https://cafc.uscourts.gov/home/oral-argument/listen-to-oral-arguments/. 

Friday, February 6, 2026, 10:00 A.M. 

Fortress Iron, LP v. Digger Specialties, Inc., No. 24-2313, Courtroom 201, Panel I 

Fortress sued Digger for infringing its U.S. Patent Nos. 9,790,707 and 10,883,290, related to vertical cable railing panels. Discovery during the suit revealed that two employees from Fortress’s Chinese manufacturing partners contributed to the inventions and should have been named co-inventors. While Fortress was able to locate and add one of them, the other omitted inventor, Huang, left his Chinese employer and could not be located. Fortress requested the district court to correct inventorship under 35 U.S.C. § 256 and add Huang as a co-inventor. The district court denied Fortress’s request because Huang was entitled to notice and hearing as a “party concerned” under § 256, but Fortress did not give him notice. And because Huang could not be properly notified, he could not be added. The court thus held the patents invalid for incorrect inventorship. Fortress appealed. 

On appeal, Fortress argues for reversal on two primary grounds. First, Fortress argues that Huang is not a “party concerned,” so Fortress need not provide him notice under § 256 in order to add him as a co-inventor. According to Fortress, Huang benefits from being added as a co-inventor and has no property interest that would be adversely affected by being named. Fortress also argues that Huang assigned his rights to his employer, who assigned them to Fortress, so even if Huang were to seek correction of inventorship, he would not have constitutional standing to do so. Second, Fortress argues that the Constitution and 35 U.S.C. § 101 do not require perfect listing of all inventors and the district court erred in invalidating its patents. To Fortress, while naming all inventors was required under pre-AIA, 35 U.S.C. § 102(f), Congress repealed that provision in enacting the AIA. 

In response, Digger argues that the district court correctly denied Fortress’s request to correct inventorship because § 256 plainly requires notice to all “parties concerned” and Huang did not receive notice. Countering Fortress’s arguments, Digger argues that § 256 does not limit “parties concerned” to those individuals whose property interest may be adversely affected or those who have constitutional standing. Regarding the repeal of pre-AIA, 35 U.S.C. § 102(f), Digger contends that Fortress’s argument ignores the overall statutory framework premising patent validity on the correct naming of all inventors, consistent with the Constitution’s objectives. 

Monday, February 9, 2026, 10:00 A.M. 

ACQIS, LLC v. EMC Corporation, No. 24-1649, Courtroom 402, Panel L 

The patent infringement saga between ACQIS and EMC makes its second stop at the Federal Circuit, this time with ACQIS challenging the district court’s attorneys’ fees award. ACQIS sued EMC for infringing its patents related to a computer interface channel, which, according to ACQIS, replaced prior art computer buses such as the parallel Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) bus. In 2017, the district court issued a claim construction ruling construing “PCI bus transaction” and other claim terms at issue. EMC subsequently moved for summary judgment of non-infringement based on the court’s claim construction. The court granted the motion, and the Federal Circuit affirmed. 

At EMC’s request, the district court found the case exceptional and awarded EMC $4 million in fees, covering the period beginning six weeks after the issuance of the claim construction order to the grant of summary judgment. The court concluded that ACQIS knew or should have known that the court’s claim construction barred infringement but it unreasonably continued to litigate infringement. ACQIS appealed. 

On appeal, among other arguments, ACQIS contends that the district erred in awarding presummary judgment fees because the district court only interpreted the disputed PCI industry standard at summary judgment, not at claim construction, to clarify the scope of “PCI bus transaction.” ACQIS argues that EMC raised the issue for the first time at summary judgment, and ACQIS presented evidence supporting its own position. According to ACQIS, its claims, although ultimately unsuccessful, were supported by evidence and not “exceptionally meritless.” ACQIS further argues that the court erred in finding ACQIS knew or should have known that it could not prove infringement after the claim construction order, pointing to the evidence it submitted at summary judgment to support its proposed interpretation of the PCI industry standard. 

EMC responds that the district court correctly found the case exceptional. According to EMC, the court’s claim construction order construed “PCI bus transaction” and two other terms, each foreclosing infringement. On “PCI bus transaction,” EMC argues that ACQIS knew the construction included all information required by the PCI industry standard, and the court’s claim construction order was clear. EMC also argues that ACQIS advanced inconsistent claim construction theories in different forums, which constitutes unreasonable litigation conduct and further supports exceptionality. In addition, EMC argues that ACQIS failed to properly raise to the district court what it now contends on appeal.