Who Is a “Consumer?” The Supreme Court Takes Up the Video Privacy Protection Act

1. Defining a VPPA “Consumer”: The Supreme Court will consider whether subscribing to any good or service offered by a video provider qualifies a person as a “consumer” under the Video Privacy Protection Act.
   
   
2. Resolving a Circuit Split: The Second and Seventh Circuits interpret “goods or services” broadly, while the Sixth and D.C. Circuits require a connection to audiovisual offerings. 
   
   
3. Potential Impact on Online Platforms: The Court’s decision could affect the scope of VPPA claims involving websites that offer videos alongside newsletters, articles, or online communities.

Introduction

The Supreme Court is set to hear arguments in Salazar v. Paramount Global, dba 247Sports on October 14, 2026, to decide who qualifies as a “consumer” entitled to the protections of the Video Privacy Protection Act (“VPPA”). The case arises from allegations that a website disclosed a user’s video-viewing history through tracking pixel technology after the user subscribed to an online newsletter. At issue is whether a person becomes a VPPA “consumer” by subscribing to any good or service offered by a video tape service provider, or only by subscribing to audiovisual goods or services specifically.

The Video Privacy Protection Act

The VPPA is a federal privacy statute enacted in 1988 that bars video tape service providers from knowingly disclosing, to any person and without consent, “personally identifiable information concerning any consumer of such provider.” ^[1] The Act defines “consumer” as “any renter, purchaser, or subscriber of goods or services from a video tape service provider.” ^[2] A prevailing plaintiff may recover $2,500 in liquidated damages, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees. ^[3]

Congress updated the statute in 2012 to permit electronic consent but left the definition of “consumer” unchanged. ^[4] In recent years, plaintiffs have invoked the VPPA against websites using the Facebook Pixel, a small piece of code embedded in a web page that can transmit a user’s video views and a Facebook identifier to Facebook. ^[5]

Background of the Dispute

Michael Salazar signed up for an online newsletter offered through Paramount’s 247Sports.com, providing his email address, and then watched videos on the site while logged in to Facebook. ^[6] He alleges that Paramount installed a Facebook tracking pixel on 247Sports.com which disclosed his Facebook identifier and video-viewing history to Facebook without his consent, in violation of the VPPA. ^[7]

The suit began at the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. The court held that Salazar had standing to sue because the alleged disclosure of his viewing history was a concrete injury, but it dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. ^[8] The court reasoned that the newsletter was not audiovisual materials, and therefore did not make Salazar a “consumer.” ^[9] Salazar appealed the decision, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed, reading “goods or services” in light of the surrounding text to mean audiovisual materials.^[10] The court also held that dismissal with prejudice was proper because Salazar had not filed a formal motion to amend. Rehearing was denied on May 13, 2025, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari on January 26, 2026. ^[11]

About six months earlier, the Second Circuit had ruled for Salazar in another suit, Salazar v. National Basketball Association. The Second Circuit held that his subscription to the NBA’s free online newsletter made him a subscriber of goods or services, and therefore a consumer. ^[12] The same plaintiff, litigating using the same theory, thus obtained opposite results in two circuits within a year.

The Question Presented

The question before the Court is whether the phrase “goods or services from a video tape service provider,” as used in the VPPA’s definition of “consumer,” refers to all of a provider’s goods or services or only to its audiovisual goods or services. ^[13] In essence, must the thing a person rents, buys, or subscribes to itself be a video, or does acquiring any product from a company that also offers videos suffice?

Several points are undisputed. Both lower courts assumed that Paramount is a video tape service provider and that the Facebook identifier and viewing history at issue constitute personally identifiable information.

The Circuit Split

The Second and Seventh Circuits read “goods or services” broadly. Any goods or services from a video tape service provider suffice. The Sixth and D.C. Circuits require audiovisual goods or services, but on different rationales.

The Second Circuit. In Salazar v. NBA, the court held that “goods or services” has no audiovisual qualifier, so exchanging personal information for a free newsletter makes a plaintiff a subscriber and therefore a consumer. ^[14]

The Seventh Circuit. In Gardner v. Me-TV National Ltd. Partnership, the court held that providing valuable data in exchange for sign-up benefits makes a person a “subscriber,” whether or not the service is video-related. The court specified that “[n]othing in the Act says that the goods or services must be video tapes or streams.” ^[15]

The Sixth Circuit. In the decision under review, the Sixth Circuit read the definition as a whole and held that “goods or services” refers to the audiovisual materials a video tape service provider offers. ^[16]

The D.C. Circuit. In Pileggi v. Washington Newspaper Publishing Co., the court held that a plaintiff must have purchased, rented, or subscribed to the specific video or similar audiovisual good or service, and that the information disclosed must concern that same good or service. Pileggi’s newsletter subscription failed that test because she reached the videos independently of the newsletter.^[17]That nexus requirement is narrower than the Sixth Circuit’s category-based limitation.

The Parties’ Arguments

Salazar’s argument is textual. He argues that “goods or services” has no audiovisual limit and covers all of a provider’s offerings, and further that Congress used “video” in the definition of personally identifiable information but not in the definition of “consumer,” which he says shows that Congress knew how to impose an audiovisual limit and did not. ^[18]

Paramount’s argument is contextual. Paramount contends that “goods or services” cannot be read in isolation. The surrounding words, “renter, purchaser, or subscriber” and “from a video tape service provider,” tie consumer status to audiovisual transactions. Paramount also invokes the VPPA’s video-focused title and structure, and to its authorization of punitive damages, as reasons for strict construction. ^[19]

Practical Takeaways

A broad ruling would enlarge potential classes and the universe of defendants. A narrow ruling would confine claims to individuals with a direct relationship to a provider’s video offerings. Regardless of the decision, litigation in this area is likely to continue. Companies that offer video alongside newsletters, articles, or online communities may want to inventory those interactions and assess how a broad reading of “consumer” would affect the size of the potential plaintiff pool.

Endnotes

[1] 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1).

[2] 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1).

[3] 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c)(2).

[4] Video Privacy Protection Act Amendments Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-258, 126 Stat. 2414 (2013).

[5] Br. for Resp’t., 3-4, Salazar v. Paramount Glob., No. 25-459 (U.S. June 23, 2026).

[6] Salazar v. Paramount Glob., 683 F. Supp. 3d 727, 733-34 (M.D. Tenn. 2023), aff’d, 133 F.4th 642 (6th Cir. 2025).

[7] Id. at 733-34.

[8] Id. at 741, 745.

[9] Id. at 745.

[10] Salazar v. Paramount Glob., 133 F.4th 642, 651-52 (6th Cir. 2025), cert. granted, 146 S. Ct. 1591 (2026).

[11] Salazar v. Paramount Glob., No. 25-459, 2026 WL 189831 (U.S. Jan. 26, 2026).

[12] Salazar v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 118 F.4th 533, 553 (2d Cir. 2024).

[13] Br. for Pet., i; Salazar v. Paramount Glob., No. 25-459 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2026).

[14] Salazar, 118 F.4th at 548.

[15] Gardner v. Me-TV Nat’l Ltd. P’ship, 132 F.4th 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2025).

[16] Salazar, 133 F.4th at 651-52.

[17] Pileggi v. Wash. Newspaper Publ’g Co., LLC, 146 F.4th 1219, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 2025).

[18] Br. for Pet., 15-27, Salazar v. Paramount Glob., No. 25-459 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2026).

[19] Br. for Resp’t., 19-51, Salazar v. Paramount Glob., No. 25-459 (U.S. June 23, 2026).