Nearly three years ago, on May 11, 2016, the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) was signed into law, providing litigants a private right of action in federal court for trade secret misappropriation claims.1 While the availability of a federal cause of action was likely a net positive for owners of trade secrets, there remained questions: how would parties litigate trade secret disputes given the availability of a federal claim, and how would courts interpret and implement the new law, particularly given the existing inconsistencies in the various state trade secrets laws modeled after the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA)? The DTSA’s relatively recent effective date means little has percolated through the courts yet, with most issued decisions dealing with injunctions or motions on the pleadings. However, if the early returns provide any indication about DTSA jurisprudence, two consequences are becoming clear: (1) the uniformity Congress desired will be lacking and (2) costs associated with trade secret litigation will increase.
Before the DTSA, aggrieved trade secret owners had to pursue legal remedies under state law. The UTSA served as a model statute for the laws in almost every state (48 by our count).2 Despite its name, the UTSA did not lead to a “uniform” set of laws—many states adopted their own variations, and courts have developed separate bodies of law for each state version.3 Although the overall impact of the differences between state laws and the UTSA is debated,4 it cannot be disputed that many meaningful differences exist, including whether the owner must show that the trade secret is not “readily ascertainable by proper means,”5 whether the owner has any rights against a party that innocently acquires a trade secret, and what is necessary to satisfy the requirement that the owner employ “reasonable measures” to maintain secrecy of the information.6 Sometimes, such as when a state has rejected the “inevitable disclosure” doctrine,7 the differences can be case dispositive.8
Congress sought to replace this so-called “patchwork of state trade secrets laws” by enacting the DTSA.9 In Congress’s view, one of the main intended benefits of the DTSA is that it would provide a “single, national standard” for trade secret misappropriation with “clear rules” and “predictability for everyone involved.”10 Congress, however, made clear that the DTSA does not preempt state trade secrets law and that it should apply in substantially the same way, but with a much broader geographic and jurisdictional reach.11 Key definitions (e.g., “trade secret,” “misappropriation,” and “improper means”) in the DTSA and UTSA are substantively similar.12 Additionally, both the House and Senate committee reports suggest that the DTSA largely conforms with state trade secrets law.13
Given this legislative backdrop and the substantive similarities between the UTSA and DTSA, it is unsurprising that courts have often analyzed state and DTSA claims together.14 Also, when considering DTSA claims (whether separately or with a state law claim), courts have repeatedly looked to existing state trade secrets law to inform their analysis. For example, in Freedom Medical Inc. v. Whitman, the court addressed the merits of a motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the defendants from using or disclosing the plaintiff’s trade secrets.15 While recognizing that the plaintiff had brought separate claims for misappropriation under the DTSA and the Pennsylvania UTSA (PUTSA), the court relied on existing Pennsylvania law when analyzing the likelihood of success, noting that the DTSA and the PUTSA “effectively proscribe the same conduct.”16 Likewise, in Wang v. Golf Tailor, LLC, when analyzing a motion to dismiss a DTSA claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the court determined that the contours of the DTSA claim were “set by California law.”17 Countless other cases illustrate this practice.
Although some courts have determined that “existing state law on trade secrets informs [their] application of the DTSA” based on the statutory similarities and legislative history,18 courts have provided additional reasons for relying on state law when analyzing a DTSA claim. Some courts, naturally, have turned to state law because of “the absence of contrary authority.”19 Others have relied on state law merely because courts in their district have previously done the same.20 Still others have taken this approach where the parties simply agreed the court may look to state law.21 Regardless of the reason for the approach, because courts are relying on existing state law, many differences in the “patchwork” of state trade secrets laws that the DTSA was intended to circumvent will inevitably be imported into each jurisdiction’s interpretation of the DTSA.22 Despite the law being in its infancy, early DTSA cases quickly reflected this pattern.
Perhaps no case demonstrates this point better than In re Patriot National Inc., a dispute before the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Delaware. The plaintiff brought three claims asserting misappropriation of various trade secrets—including “customer lists”—under three separate statutes: the Missouri UTSA (MUTSA), the Florida UTSA (FUTSA), and the DTSA.23 Defendants, Brentwood and Shaiper, filed separate motions for judgment on the pleadings.24 Before turning to the motions, the court concluded that Missouri law applied to the claims against Brentwood because Missouri had the most significant relationship to the allegations, while Florida law applied to the claims against Shaiper because of a prior agreement governing choice of law.25
Relying on Missouri state law, the court found that the plaintiff’s “customer lists” could not constitute a trade secret under the MUTSA, so it dismissed that claim against Brentwood.26 However, because Florida law treats customer lists differently, the court permitted the plaintiff to pursue a misappropriation claim of the same trade secret against Shaiper under the FUTSA.27 In analyzing the federal DTSA claims, the court could have picked Florida or Missouri law, or even used Delaware law. Instead, it picked nothing, deciding to “mirror its rulings under the MUTSA and the FUTSA” for the DTSA claims.28 Thus, based entirely on the court’s disparate treatment of the same claim under Missouri and Florida law, the plaintiff was able to pursue a DTSA claim for the exact same trade secret against only one of the two defendants.29
Other cases confirm that meaningful differences in state law will permeate DTSA jurisprudence. As noted, courts have been divided on the applicability of the “inevitable disclosure” doctrine, and that division is likely to continue with the DTSA. Consistent with past treatment in California, a district court recently struck allegations of misappropriation under the DTSA that were based on a theory of “inevitable disclosure,” explaining that California courts have “resoundingly rejected” the doctrine.30 A Pennsylvania district court recently took the opposite approach and concluded that an “inevitable disclosure” theory is viable for claims under both the DTSA and PUTSA.31 Yet another example is the presumption of irreparable harm. Courts in California and Illinois, for example, have presumed the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm in analyzing a motion for a preliminary injunction based on a DTSA claim.32 Conversely, the Tenth Circuit has made clear that, in its view, the DTSA allows no presumption of irreparable harm.33 This lack of uniformity is inconsistent with Congress’s vision for the DTSA.
Although Congress criticized the state law domain as “inadequate” and envisioned the DTSA as being more suitable to deal with trade secret theft,34 litigants have not treated the DTSA as a comprehensive solution. In fact, since the enactment of the DTSA, most litigants pursuing a DTSA claim (over 80% by our estimates) have also filed a corresponding state law claim, often under the state law in which the federal court sits.35 Perhaps, the volume of parallel suits will diminish over time, but the availability of a federal claim under the DTSA will increase costs in several ways.
First, parties must stay apprised of at least two bodies of law. While parties will always need to understand the basic statutory differences between the DTSA and UTSA (such as the separate requirement under the DTSA relating to interstate or foreign commerce),36 given the emerging DTSA case law, it will be critical to understand (1) how the DTSA is being implemented in each jurisdiction; (2) how courts are adjudicating cases with parallel DTSA and state law claims; and (3) whether, and to what extent, that implementation differs from any other state law claims that may be at issue, which could be especially important in situations involving a state law claim from a different jurisdiction. For example, on the latter point, a Michigan federal court considering claims under the DTSA and the Wisconsin UTSA (WUTSA) could analyze the DTSA claim under Michigan law and the WUTSA claim using Wisconsin law, forcing the parties to litigate differences between Michigan and Wisconsin law. Surveying the legal landscape and staying abreast of any changes in law will require parties to expend significant resources before and during litigation.
Second, the number of procedural and substantive disputes will likely increase. Parties always look for ways to increase their chances of winning. As litigants realize that courts will rely on their own jurisdiction’s law when analyzing a DTSA claim, forum shopping will naturally occur, leading to an increase in motions to transfer venue or to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The number of choice-of-law disputes will also grow, as parties will battle over the “applicable law”—i.e., whatever law favors their position.
Third, parallel claims will inevitably lead to more paperwork. Even though many courts have treated DTSA and state UTSA claims similarly, parties looking to benefit from this practice will still need to establish through briefing that the analyses of the DTSA and state claims should not differ. Also, when there are meaningful differences, parties will invariably spill additional ink advocating their opposing views. Parties may also need to brief issues under competing laws. As seen in In re Patriot National Inc., a case might have multiple trade secret claims, one under the DTSA and others under one or more state laws. In such situations, courts may need to tackle similar issues under multiple laws, which adds to the cost and complexity of litigation. Discovery costs should also increase, even if only minimally. For example, while discovery rarely needs to be tailored to any particular trade secret statute, parties must ensure that they have covered their bases for any distinctions among the laws. This may include added costs for targeted discovery relating to the DTSA’s commerce requirement, or further expenses relating to longer (and repetitive) interrogatory responses or arguments in an export report merely to provide a comprehensive position that covers all aspects of both state law and DTSA claims.
While this is not an exhaustive list, it illustrates several ways that the DTSA is simply evolving into another layer of law that increases costs. As discussed below, in some circumstances, these increased costs may be offset by certain benefits, such as the potential for greater punitive damages.
In light of the inconsistent treatment of the DTSA, parties will need to understand the legal landscape to ensure that they are best situated to pursue or defend against trade secrets claims. Below are several strategies to consider:
Although these two questions are largely intertwined, one obvious takeaway is that trade secret owners need to be aware of the high likelihood that a DTSA claim may be analyzed under (or impacted by) the pre-existing state trade secrets law of the governing jurisdiction. With this in mind, plaintiffs should analyze the law in all jurisdictions they are considering before suing.
On the issue of adding a parallel state UTSA claim, there are competing interests. One downside (for plaintiffs) of including a state UTSA claim is the potential for preemption of common-law claims (e.g., unjust enrichment or conversion) based on the same alleged wrongful conduct as the trade secrets claim. Because there is no preemption under the DTSA, however, the risk of losing those common-law claims on preemption grounds is eliminated by filing only a DTSA claim. If plaintiffs have strong common-law claims, it may be prudent to forgo the state UTSA claim rather than risk preemption. Plaintiffs should be mindful that, even if preemption is a concern, rulings on preemption are often delayed until summary judgment, when courts resolve choice-of-law disputes. Even when the choice of law is clear, courts will not always address preemption early on, as some courts are more receptive to preemption attacks at the pleading stage than others.37
Forgoing a state UTSA claim could also be beneficial when litigating in certain jurisdictions. For example, when asserting a claim under the California UTSA (CUTSA), before commencing discovery, plaintiffs must identify their trade secrets with “reasonable particularity”38—something all defendants desire. Because some courts have found that DTSA claims need not be pled with the same particularity, however, a DTSA plaintiff might delay providing a detailed trade secrets disclosure in California—while discovery gets underway—by forgoing a CUTSA claim.39 Another example is found Oklahoma, where plaintiffs have a lower burden to plead a DTSA claim than they do to plead a claim under the Oklahoma UTSA (OUTSA). Notwithstanding the similarities between the DTSA and OUTSA, plaintiffs pursuing claims under the OUTSA must also show “use” and “detriment.”40 Bringing both OUTSA and DTSA claims will have the practical effect of raising the pleading standard for the DTSA claim.
Another consideration relates to damages and attorney’s fees. Under the DTSA, parties may seek “exemplary” (i.e., punitive) damages up to twice the amount of ordinary damages if the trade secret is “willfully and maliciously misappropriated.”41 While some state statutes (like California’s) include the same cap on punitive damages, others (e.g., Ohio’s) allow up to three times in damages.42 Similarly, the DTSA permits the prevailing party to recover reasonable attorney’s fees in certain circumstances, but the statutes in several states (e.g., Missouri) do not.43 If a defendant’s misconduct appears egregious, it might be wise to also file a state UTSA claim—while risking preemption—in a jurisdiction with favorable damages provisions.
Finally, as demonstrated by a case in the Eastern District of Virginia, it may be sensible to pursue parallel claims simply because outcomes are unpredictable. There, a jury found that only eight of the 67 alleged trade secrets presented to it actually constituted trade secrets.44 The jury then concluded, for the Texas UTSA claim, that all eight trade secrets had been misappropriated, but it determined that only seven had been misappropriated for the DTSA claim.45 This seems like a strange result, and there was no apparent explanation for the distinction. Nevertheless, this case demonstrates the value in having multiple claims before a jury.
In short, deciding where to file and whether to add a parallel state law claim will require thoughtful analysis of the issues that could be affected by the forum selection and the addition (or lack of) a state UTSA claim.
When contracting with potential employees or business partners, parties should carefully consider the state law chosen in a forum-selection clause. The ability to dictate which state’s laws apply will not only affect which state UTSA claim may be brought, but it will also likely impact which state’s law will be applied to any related DTSA claim, making it important to find the state law that is most beneficial to any potential dispute.
Because the DTSA has increased both the opportunity and incentive for plaintiffs to forum shop, defendants must contemplate how they can use the DTSA to counter that strategic move. In this regard, defendants should carefully assess whether they will benefit from a challenge to the court’s personal jurisdiction. Although this defense is usually considered at the early stages of any litigation, defendants sometimes choose not to pursue it if no advantage can be gained by a change in jurisdiction. This may be the situation in patent cases, where the substantive law is the same in any alternative forum. The inconsistent treatment of the DTSA across the district courts could change that calculus, making a challenge to personal jurisdiction a more attractive option to shift the odds in defendants’ favor, especially if the plaintiff has only pursued a claim under the DTSA.
As with personal jurisdiction, if there is another forum where the DTSA will be applied more favorably, defendants should consider a transfer of venue too. Particularly relevant here is that, in analyzing a venue-transfer question, courts will consider the “familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern the case.”46 If, for example, a plaintiff brings a FUTSA claim in Georgia, the defendant could consider a venue transfer to Florida, which would likely result in Florida law (not Georgia) applying to the DTSA claim. In this situation, the “familiarity” factor should favor a transfer in venue to Florida. At the same time, because the DTSA is federal law, district courts are presumed to be equally familiar with it,47 so the DTSA claim should have a neutral effect on the court’s venue-transfer analysis.
Parties should be prepared for uncertainty regarding which law will apply. One reason for that uncertainty is timing, as courts often do not resolve choice-of-law disputes until summary judgment, which brings lengthy uncertainty on potentially case-dispositive issues. DTSA claims only muddy things further because parties may not know, until the summary-judgment phase or later, how the court will analyze the claim. For example, if a federal court in Florida is presented with a choice between state UTSA claims under Florida and Wisconsin law, and it deems that Wisconsin law should apply, will it still look to Florida law to inform its analysis of the DTSA claim, or will it simply fold the DTSA claim into its analysis of the WUTSA claim under Wisconsin law? The court would have at least three possible choices of law: Wisconsin for both the state UTSA and DTSA claims, Florida for both, or a split. As evidenced by In re Patriot National Inc., choice-of-law issues may become even more complicated when there are multiple defendants and multiple state UTSA claims.
Litigants looking for certainty on the choice of law should raise the issue early on (e.g., at the Rule 16 conference) to put it on the court’s radar and increase the chances that the court will resolve the issue sooner. Another way to combat the uncertainty relating to the choice of law may be to show that the choice does not matter. If parties can convince the court that the outcome on a particular issue will be the same under either law, the court may be inclined to rule earlier (e.g., at the pleadings stage) without waiting to undertake a comprehensive choice-of-law analysis.
Just because courts may be inclined to treat DTSA and state UTSA claims similarly, parties need not concede that the analysis should be the same under both statutes. If the outcome of a dispute would arguably be different if the case were in another jurisdiction, parties should note the difference and try to persuade the court to analyze the DTSA and state UTSA claims separately. Commentators have argued for this approach, suggesting that courts should interpret the DTSA on its own to promote uniformity among the federal courts.48 Notwithstanding the current trend, some courts may also be receptive to this idea. At the very least, presenting the potentially different outcomes should force the court to address the issue.
When a case has parallel state UTSA and DTSA claims, parties cannot forget to address both. A recent case before the Northern District of Illinois illustrates this point. The court granted summary judgment for the defendant on the plaintiff ’s DTSA claim but not on its Illinois Trade Secrets Act (ITSA) claim.49 This disparity, however, simply stemmed from the defendant’s failure to move for judgment on the ITSA claim.50 The court even noted its confusion on why the defendant did not move for summary judgment on the ITSA claim, suggesting that, had the defendant simply tacked the ITSA claim onto the motion, the court would have granted judgment on both claims because of the overlap between the DTSA and pre-existing state trade secrets laws.51
While DTSA jurisprudence is still evolving, it has become clear that Congress’s plan is not coming to fruition, as the DTSA has created more divergent trade secrets law while increasing expenses. Regardless of what Congress intended, however, parties must adapt to the current circumstances. Whether considering a lawsuit or actively litigating one, parties can take proactive steps to increase their odds of obtaining a favorable result. As should be apparent from the preceding discussion, chief among these steps is learning how courts are handling DTSA claims and understanding how any differences in treatment may affect the issue at hand.
1 See Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, § 2, 130 Stat. 376, 376–82 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (2012)).
2 See Brand Energy & Infrastructure Servs., Inc. v. Irex Contracting Grp., No. CV 16-2499, 2017 WL 1105648, at *7 & n.15 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 2017) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 114-529, at 12 (2016)). Massachusetts has since adopted its
own version of the UTSA.
3 See Adams Arms, LLC v. Unified Weapon Sys., Inc., No. 8:16-CV-1503-T-33AEP, 2016 WL 5391394, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 27, 2016) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 114-529, at 4).
4 See Brittany S. Bruns, Criticism of the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016: Failure to Preempt, 32 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 469, 475–76 (2017).
5 Id. at 478–79.
6 S. Rep 114-220, at 2–3 (2016).
7 The inevitable disclosure doctrine allows a plaintiff to prove a claim of trade secret misappropriation by demonstrating that the defendant’s new employment will inevitably lead to the defendant’s reliance on the plaintiff’s trade secrets.
8 See, e.g., Katch, LLC v. Sweetser, 143 F. Supp. 3d 854, 865 (D. Minn. 2015) (“Whether California or Minnesota law applies to Katch’s trade secrets claim is important because California categorically rejects the ‘inevitable disclosure’ doctrine . . . .”).
9 162 Cong. Rec. H2031 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 2016).
10 H.R. Rep No. 114-529, at 6; S. Rep. No. 114-220, at 14–15; 162 Cong. Rec. H2032 (Rep. Conyers offering his support for the bill because it “would foster uniformity among the States”).
11 See 18 U.S.C. § 1838 (2012) (“[T]his chapter shall not be construed to preempt or displace any other remedies, whether civil or criminal, provided by United States Federal, State, commonwealth, possession, or territory law for the misappropriation of a trade secret . . . .”); H.R. Rep. No. 114-529, at 2–5, 12–14.
12 Compare 18 U.S.C. §§ 1836, 1839, with Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1 (Unif. Law Comm’n, amended 1985).
13 See H.R. Rep. No. 114-529, at 14 (noting the DTSA “is not intended to alter the balance of current trade secret law or alter specific court decisions” on misappropriation); S. Rep. No. 114-220, at 10 (same).
14 See, e.g., Veronica Foods Co. v. Ecklin, No. 16-CV-07223-JCS, 2017 WL 2806706, at *13 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 2017) (explaining that courts have addressed DTSA claims in conjunction with claims under states’ versions of the UTSA); Abrasic 90 Inc. v. Weldcote Metals, Inc., No. 18 C 05376, 2019 WL 1044322, at *5 n.3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2019) (analyzing the DTSA and ITSA together “because the pertinent definitions of the two acts overlap” (quoting Molon Motor & Coil Corp. v. Nidec Motor Corp., No. 16 C 03545, 2017 WL 1954531, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2017))); Agilysys, Inc. v. Hall, 258 F. Supp. 3d 1331, 1348 (N.D. Ga. 2017) (ruling on DTSA claims based solely
on its analysis of GTSA claims); Mickey’s Linen v. Fischer, No. 17 C 2154, 2017 WL 3970593, at *8 n.1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 2017) (considering DTSA and Illinois Trade Secrets Act claims together because the “DTSA is based on the same Uniform Act as the ITSA”).
15 343 F. Supp. 3d 509, 518 (E.D. Pa. 2018).
16 Id. at 518 n.6.
17 No. 17-CV-00898-LB, 2017 WL 2861111, at *4–5 (N.D. Cal. July 5, 2017).
18 Source Prod. & Equip. Co. v. Schehr, No. CV 16-17528, 2017 WL 3721543, at *2 (E.D. La. Aug. 29, 2017).
19 See Deerpoint Grp., Inc. v. Agrigenix, LLC, 345 F. Supp. 3d 1207, 1228 (E.D. Cal. 2018).
20 See Medidata Sols., Inc., v. Veeva Sys. Inc., No. 17 CIV. 589 (LGS), 2018 WL 6173349, at *3 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2018).
21 See Kuryakyn Holdings, LLC v. Ciro, LLC, 242 F. Supp. 3d 789, 797–98 (W.D. Wis. 2017).
22 Because some states, like California, have multiple federal district courts, there could even be distinct versions of the DTSA within the Federal courts of the same state.
23 In re Patriot Nat’l Inc., 592 B.R. 560, 574 (Bankr. D. Del. 2018).
24 Id. at 568.
25 Id. at 574 n.8.
26 Id. at 575.
27 Id. at 576–77.
28 Id. at 577–78.
29 See id.
30 UCAR Tech. (USA) Inc. v. Yan Li, No. 5:17-CV-01704-EJD, 2017 WL 6405620, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2017).
31 Jazz Pharm., Inc. v. Synchrony Grp., LLC, 343 F. Supp. 3d 434, 446 & n.52 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (citing Fres-co Sys. USA, Inc. v. Hawkins, 690 F. App’x 72, 76 (3d Cir. 2017)).
32 See Comet Techs. U.S. of Am. Inc. v. Beuerman, No. 18-CV-01441-LHK, 2018 WL 1990226, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2018); Signal Fin. Holdings LLC v. Looking Glass Fin. LLC, No. 17 C 8816, 2018 WL 636769, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 2018).
33 DTC Energy Grp., Inc. v. Hirschfeld, 912 F.3d 1263, 1270 n.3 (10th Cir. 2018); First W. Capital Mgmt. Co. v. Malamed, 874 F.3d 1136, 1143 (10th Cir. 2017).
34 162 Cong. Rec. H2033 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 2016).
35 After noticing a theme of plaintiffs bringing parallel state UTSA and DTSA claims, we reviewed roughly the first 120 complaints filed in 2019 that contained a DTSA claim. Over 80% also included a parallel state law claim (e.g., a claim under the PUTSA), and several also contained multiple corresponding state claims (e.g., claims under both the PUTSA and FUTSA).
36 See DLMC, Inc. v. Flores, No. CV 18-00352 DKW-RT, 2019 WL 309754, at *2 (D. Haw. Jan. 23, 2019) (dismissing DTSA claim for lack of jurisdiction where complaint did not articulate how the alleged stolen trade secrets relate to interstate commerce).
37 Compare Infinite Energy, Inc. v. Catalyst Energy, LLC, No. 1:06-CV-2923-CAP, 2007 WL 9702596, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 16, 2007) (“A complaint may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) when its own allegations indicate the existence of an affirmative defense—such as preemption . . . .”), with Advanced Fluid Sys., Inc. v. Huber, 28 F. Supp. 3d 306, 325 & n.10 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (finding preemption at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage “premature”).
38 See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 2019.210 (West 2019).
39 Compare Physician’s Surrogacy, Inc. v. German, No. 17CV0718-MMA (WVG), 2017 WL 3622329, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2017) (finding DTSA claims need not be plead with the same particularity “as is required of plaintiffs asserting claims under [the CUTSA]”), with Human Longevity, Inc. v. J. Craig Venter Inst., Inc., No. 18CV1656-WQH-LL, 2018 WL 6617633, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2018) (suggesting California’s particularity requirements apply to DTSA claims), and Poynt Corp. v. Innowi, Inc., No. 18-CV-05814-BLF, 2019 WL 935499, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2019) (directing plaintiff who brought DTSA and CUTSA claims to identify trade secrets with “reasonable particularity” as required by California law to “move the case along efficiently”).
40 Blue Star Land Servs., LLC v. Coleman, No. CIV-17-931-R, 2017 WL 6210901, at *7 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 8, 2017).
41 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(C) (2012).
42 Compare, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.3(c) (West 2019), with Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1333.63(B) (West 2019).
43 See Bruns, supra note 4, at 485.
44 Steves & Sons, Inc. v. JELD-WEN, Inc., No. 3:16CV545, 2018 WL 6272893, at *4 (E.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2018).
46 In re Nintendo Co., 589 F.3d 1194, 1198 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
47 See, e.g., Intrepid Potash–N.M., LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 669 F. Supp. 2d 88, 98 (D.D.C. 2009) (“[A]ll federal courts are presumed to be equally familiar with the law governing federal statutory claims.”).
48 See, e.g., Patrick Ruelle, The Defend Trade Secrets Act: Why Interpreting the New Law on Its Own Terms Promotes Uniformity, 21 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 249 (2017).
49 Call One, Inc. v. Anzine, No. 18 C 124, 2018 WL 2735089, at *9 (N.D. Ill. June 7, 2018).
50 See id. at *1 n.1.
51 See id. at *9.
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